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INTRODUCTION: SOUTH-SOUTH INEQUALITY AND THE QUESTION OF 
CHINESE FDI IN ARGENTINA
“And now a word for ourselves, for the peoples of Latin America: what is the 
image of the society we want to establish, and what are its political and human 
values? From the very outset, we must look beyond the economic system. But if 
such a society is to be built, the economic system will have to acquire complete 
efficiency, so that the kind of welfare which is measurable can be extended to the 
whole community, to the broad masses of the population.”
 –Raúl Prebisch, 1971 
Argentine Economist Raúl Prebisch was one of the first economic thinkers of the 
20th century to consider how classical economic theory could not properly account for the 
changing social and political dynamics in Latin America that ultimately have a 
tremendous effect on the economy, and more broadly, in other “underdeveloped” nations. 
In this quote, many of the central themes that have dominated discussion on development 
in the region are laid bare: how can an economic system based on capitalist extraction 
perform the necessary functions of social welfare and human development? What is the 
relationship between political economy and social justice? What shifts are needed in 
policy to attain these functions?
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Although Prebisch died before the turn of the century, many of these questions 
remain relevant as his native Argentina has grown and transformed in an increasingly 
globalized economy. Whereas powers in the Global North dominated economic 
development in Latin America during the height of Prebisch’s career, a significant shift 
away from this uneven north-south dynamic occurred with the incredible rise of China on 
the global stage. 
The People’s Republic of China burst onto the global marketplace in the past 20 
years as a major economic force; the country now represents one of the worlds largest 
economies, both in terms of domestic consumption and production as well as in foreign 
direct investment (FDI), diplomatic influence, and international politics. Driven by 
internal demand, China has expanded its trade relationships extensively with other 
countries in the Global South (because while China has indeed seen meteoric growth, its 
course of development and trajectory are significantly different in comparison to nations 
associated with the Global North, thereby identifying itself with the South) by advocating 
on the international stage for south-south economic and social solidarity. Since 2000, 
Chinese FDI has increased at an unprecedented rate in Africa, Southeast and Western 
Asia, and Latin America and the Carribean. In many important ways, Chinese FDI differs 
from FDI from western nations or companies in its goals, stipulations, and structures. 
Most importantly, however, is the way in which Chinese FDI can shape the economic 
infrastructure and geography of a host country. In other regions of the Global South as 
disparate as Ethiopia and Indonesia, Chinese FDI has reshaped the face of public 
infrastructure like transportation and housing, as well as resource extraction sectors and 
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other industrial practices. Therefore, understanding the significant role of Chinese FDI 
plays a part in looking at the political economy of many cities in the Global South.
Urban environments all over the world are changing rapidly in response to climate 
change, population growth, and changing global economies. While American cities face 
challenges typical of post-industrial, highly diversified economies in the Global North, 
the experience of cities and nations in the Global South, and more specifically Latin 
America, is considerably different and often mischaracterized by Western media and 
tradition conventions of scholarship.  Concepts like white flight, suburbanization, or 
gentrification are relatively well understood by the typical student of urban phenomenon, 
but different methodologies and terminology are necessary to unpack the political 
economies of cities in the Global South that have unique issues that these conventional 
understandings of urban dynamics don’t properly depict. 
It’s undoubtable that the US and other nations in Europe have had and continue to 
have their own experiences with poverty, but histories of colonialism in Latin America 
created incredible inequalities whose basis lies in exploitative economic practices and 
asymmetrical structures of power built into the hierarchical legacies of colonialism, and 
perhaps to an even more relevant extent, neocolonialism/US imperialism. This inequality 
can be seen in both the economic makeup of individual cities, as well as a nation or 
region’s urban network as a whole. Economic inequalities in Latin America as a whole 
have exacerbated and expanded in significant ways during the late 20th and early 21st 
century as the result of changes in the global economy that has shifted foreign investment 
in the region away from investors originating in the Global North and more towards a 
mix of public and private, northern and southern nations. At the same time, these trading 
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relationships retain many of the features of their historical roots, thereby creating further 
economic, political, and social instability. In Latin America, there’s no better place to 
examine how these inequalities play out across the landscape than cities, where the vast 
majority of people in the region live. 
Almost nowhere else is this truer than Argentina. Argentina is one of the most 
highly urbanized nations in the world. As of 2017, almost 92% of the nation’s 44 million 
inhabitants lived in urban areas (World Bank). As a result, the wealthiest and the poorest 
often end up living steps from each other, visually and literally symbolizing these 
enormous economic inequalities. Informal settlements, or areas of housing where tenants 
have no legal rights to the land, structures are informally built, and access to utilities is 
limited or nonexistent, exist in nearly every city in Argentina and are prominent fixtures 
within the capital, Buenos Aires. These villas miserias, as Argentines refer to them, have 
not always existed. Not to say that poverty is new to Argentina—but rather, that the 
unique political economic forces that have governed investment and development have 
thrust disparate social classes together and apart in unforeseen ways, changing the 
geography of inequality in Argentina. While for a long time these inequalities have 
resulted from unequal relationships with the Global North, the 21st century has seen a new 
trend with China.  
Western media and many scholars tend to take on an alarmist view when 
examining Chinese investment around the globe—sometimes with good reason, 
sometimes under pretenses of racism and anxiety over Communist/nonwestern influence. 
In Argentina, too, many critics are weary of China’s growing influence in the region, 
with many drawing comparisons to older asymmetrical power dynamics like with Spain, 
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the United States, or the United Kingdom. However, in this thesis I argue that these 
models of understanding are outdated and separated from the historical moment in which 
they originated. Instead, I suggest that while Chinese FDI in Argentina is administered 
and structured in different ways from previous forms of investment, so too has the 
structure of Argentina’s political economy, and therefore its urban and economic 
geography, shifted in some forms but stayed the same in others in a manner that makes it 
remarkably easy for Chinese investors to take advantage of its asymmetrical power 
structure.
In Chapter Two, I trace the history of Argentina’s political economy, starting 
roughly after WWII and culminating in the post-2001 crisis reaction. I focus here 
particularly on the administrations of three important presidents who shaped the national 
debate on the structures of Argentina’s economy—Juan Domingo Perón, Carlos Menem, 
and Nestor Kirchner. While there were certainly significant moments of change under 
other Argentine governments (notably the military dictatorship during the late 1970s-
1980s) I chose these three administrations as their legacies have proven to be important to 
contextualizing discussions of political economy through each leader’s respective 
political philosophy—Peronismo, Menemismo, and Kirchnerismo. The hybrid nature of 
Argentina’s current political economy (which is closest in substance to Kirchnerismo) 
can be understood as a combination of certain aspects of the statist-developmental 
attitudes of Peronismo, with the faith in market forces typical of Menemismo. 
In Chapter Three, I focus on how urban geography factors into this discussion of 
political economy. Highly unequal and operating on a clear center-periphery dynamic, I 
look briefly at the historical development of Argentina’s urban fabric that made Buenos 
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Aires fabulously wealthy, while relegating regional capitals and other less 
affluent/populous cities to a clear secondary, even tertiary level of wealth and influence. 
While this hierarchy of cities has largely remained intact, patterns of settlement within 
these cities has deteriorated away from traditional modes of urban settlement towards the 
stark dichotomy between rich and poor living near each other, industrial infrastructure 
spread out, and increasing divides between the center (Buenos Aires) and the peripheral 
provinces (broadly speaking, the provinces and their cities).
In Chapters Four and Five, I deal with the changing face of foreign investment in 
Argentina during the 21st century, namely from China. In Chapter Four, I explore the 
various domestic and internal factors that have led to China’s dramatic increase in 
domestic consumption and production, and the arguments for the need to extend its 
influence to different regions of the Global South. I tie into this discussion why Argentina 
has largely welcomed Chinese investment following the infamous 2001 financial crisis, 
as mismanagement and defaulting on loans alienated the nation from Western lenders. 
Finally, in Chapter Five I look to a Space Station project financed and run by the Chinese 
government that caused controversy amongst Argentine political leaders and the public as 
a case study for the effects. As evidenced through my discussion of the trajectory of 
Argentine political economy in Chapter Two and of urban geography and inequality in 
Chapter Three, I find that many of the structural features that negate the importance 
asymmetrical power relationships play when thinking about capital accumulation and 
production have remained and are primed to be taken advantaged of by ideologically-
neutral but economically powerful Chinese FDI. 
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I would like to note, as well, the topics that my work does not specifically cover. I 
don’t intend to speak extensively on China’s own political economy, as primarily the 
focus of this paper is on Argentina and its internal political economy—the information 
and analysis I have included about China’s domestic programs and foreign goals only 
serve the purpose of putting it in relation to Argentina. Second, although rural 
development is of equal importance as urban development within Argentina’s economic 
system, here I will only speak to rural development as it is relevant to urban 
developments. Third, although there are many examples of urban inequality within 
Buenos Aires and other cities in Argentina and some of those examples are included in 
this work, I intend to speak about inequality within Argentina’s urban network as a 
whole, rather than one specific place. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
ARGENTINA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY ON THE PATH TO KIRCHNERISMO
How Argentina’s particular pattern of urban settlement came about, and how it is 
subject to change, is closely tied with the nation’s historical political economy. Like 
virtually all other Latin American nations, Argentina in the 20th century grappled with 
how to facilitate economic, fiscal independence from the Global North, (generally) an 
obvious consequence of the nation’s historical colonial relationships. As a “Third World” 
nation, much attention has been given to development policies in Argentinian politics. At 
one time considered one of the wealthiest nations of the Americas, various recessions, 
regime changes, asymmetrical trade and diplomacy relationships, and globalization 
significantly altered the political economy of Argentina during the 20th century and into 
the 21st, culminating in the 2001 financial crisis that left nearly 50% of the workforce 
unemployed. Economic insecurity and changes to Argentina’s market have driven 
unequal levels of growth in the center (Buenos Aires) and the periphery—e.g., the rest of 
the country. 
In order to understand this phenomena, I look to scholarship done on the history 
of Argentina’s political economy. As a post-colonial nation, Argentina has from its 
beginning been involved somehow in global trade networks, usually through dependent 
relationships with wealthy countries of the Global North. Although Argentina’s earlier 
development is of great importance, I focus here primarily on political economy 
development from the 1970s to the present. Specifically, the rhetoric and policy that 
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shifted the country away from protectionist/developmentalist policies pursued before 
1976 to open market, neoliberal deregulation following the military dictatorship that 
provoked unprecedented housing, economic, and material insecurity leading into the 21st 
century. 
Since the 2001 crisis, the Argentinian government (starting with Nestor Kirchner) 
have pursued what is referred to as a neodevelopmentalist policy, which features aspects 
of both developmentalist and neoliberal modes of capitalism. These features of 
Argentina’s political economy assist in illuminating the nature of inequitable regional, 
urban/rural dynamics present in the country. How Argentina arrived at a 
neodevelopmentalist model of capitalism can be explained through the previous two 
phases, and the subsequent financial restructuring that each transition required. The first 
stage occurred with the military dictatorship that took control of the country between 
1976 and 1983, after which democracy was reestablished. Through violent and 
authoritarian methods, the military government forced the liberalization of the economy 
that continued into the transition to democracy. Argentinian governments prior to the 
dictatorship, especially under Perón, pursued policies that promoted growth through 
acquiring debt, protecting domestic industries from competition abroad, strong labor 
unions, and a significant social safety net. However, these policies left Argentina debt-
burdened by promoting rampant inflation and a large domestic debt. 
In order to ameliorate these problems, the dictatorship enacted policies that broke 
down this developmentalist model, instead replacing it with a laisse-faire vision for the 
national economy. By positing that the dictatorship and subsequent democratic 
governments pursued “economic liberalization,” I mean to say that, essentially, these 
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policies opened Argentina’s economy to broader international investment and trade, with 
a focus on exporting raw commodities. This focus, known as neoliberalism, had adverse 
effects on socioeconomic equality and the working class. Féliz defines neoliberalism as, 
“a class-project led by dominant classes around the world to impose the restructuration of 
capitalist relations of production and reproduction so as to overcome the conditions that 
led to the capitalist crisis of the 1960s and 1970s.” (Féliz 2012, 119) In other words, 
neoliberalism can be viewed as an attempt by capitalist elites to solve the dysfunctions of 
capitalism by removing regulatory influences on the open market. 
In the case of Argentina, as Lewis points out, “the economy was opened and 
wages disciplined: ‘efficiency’ and ‘accumulation’ were suggested by export growth, a 
massive inflow of foreign capital, and a near forty percent contraction in real wages.” 
(Lewis 2002, 150) At first, these neoliberal trade reforms seemed to be successful. The 
Argentinian economy grew rapidly, and seemed to be playing a larger part in the global 
economy. However, as Lewis argues, this real growth didn’t translate into benefitting 
everyone. Exporting raw goods, speculative international capital, and a weakening of 
trade unions/wages for the working class began to many Argentinians, especially those in 
the middle and working classes. Many in the middle-class slipped into poverty as a result 
of the removal of protections like state-managed wages, pensions, and other social 
welfare programs, while the capitalist, ruling class benefitted enormously from these 
liberal trade deals. Therefore, the divide between the rich and poor widened dramatically 
during this period.
Neoliberal capitalism continued to be the dominant political narrative in 
Argentina until 2001, when the financial crisis viscerally exposed the contradictions 
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inherent to the system. In a paper on the nature of neodevelopmentalism in Argentina 
since the 90s, Mariano Féliz describes how this restructuring of the economy played out 
in years before the 2001 crisis. Neoliberal reforms continued post-dictatorship during the 
1980s, which Féliz describes as, “a conflictive period of sociopolitical clashes regarding 
the imposition of new neoliberal rules of production and reproduction of society.” (Féliz 
2012, 107) However, Argentina’s internationally coordinated neoliberal project didn’t 
begin in earnest until democratic elections were held in 1989. Following Carlos Menem’s 
1989 election victory, “the dominant classes,” as Féliz describes it, sought to enact what 
was referred to as “convertibility plan” in order to meet the restructuring requirements of 
the IMF and World Bank. The plan, 
“…included fixing the nominal exchange-rate to the US dollar, the privatization 
of most public companies and public services (including social security), the 
flexibilization of labour-market legislation, the deregulation of economic 
activities (in particular, regarding the participation of foreign capital in the local 
economy) and the unilateral liberalization of foreign-trade and financial-capital 
movements…” (Féliz 2012, 107) 
These reforms ultimately created the conditions upon which the 2001 crisis 
occurred. This is due to the social, economic, and political effects that the convertibility 
plan had on the average Argentinian. Regarded as essential for integrating Argentina 
within the global market, these reforms radically changed the structure and 
reliability/precariousness of employment, wages, housing, for most not a part of the 
dominant classes. Whitson says on this subject that previously formalized employment 
was gradually replaced with short-term employment opportunities that did not match the 
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stability of the former. She states, “This in itself does not signal an increase in 
informality; however, it represents decreased legal protections to workers and the 
relaxing of contractual checks on part-time work forms, conditions that resulted in the 
informalization of previously formal forms of work.” (Whitson 2007, 125) In this 
manner, substandard benefits and legal protections for workers help characterize how the 
neoliberal development project let so many slip into poverty. 
As a result of these structural shifts that increased the precariousness of 
employment, informal work exploded during this period. The privatization of various 
public services led to rampant lay-offs and wage decreases for employees of the state, 
and a decline in spending on health care and education further led to the creation of what 
Rapoport calls, “the new poor.” (Rapoport 2002) Scores of Argentinians who once relied 
on dependable salaries were now thrust into a situation where there was no guarantee of 
employment, and even so, jobs may have little to no benefits. Further complicating this 
period was that inflation and stagnation caused by pinning the peso to the US dollar led to 
a sharp increase in the price of basic goods like foodstuffs. (Whitson 2007, 123) 
Undoubtedly, this period was marked by increasing anxiety over the precarious nature of 
everyday life for most Argentinians. Even more so, increase reliance on informal labor 
changed the fundamental structure of the economy in that informal work became an 
essential part in ensuring that the capitalist class could still promote growth, despite the 
precarious position that the system imposed on many. Whitson makes this claim by 
looking to Marxist theorizations about labor-capital relations: “…the neo-Marxist 
approach posits that informal work is intimately connected to the formal sector in a 
relationship of dependency similar to that of peripheral and core countries.” (Whitson 
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2007, 124) Therefore, just as countries of the Global North depend on the domination and 
poverty of poorer nations to fuel growth, so too, then does informal labor compliment the 
capitalist class. However, this does not necessarily mean that the resulting economic 
growth will be equally distributed, or even distributed at all outside of the concentrated 
elite class. Moreover, this dependent relationship is built on the subservience of the 
informal market to the formal market, on informal laborers for the production of formal 
capital. Féliz remarks that the higher levels of “competitiveness” did not translate into 
economic security for most Argentinians, but rather put the responsibility of profit on 
lowering wages and employment protections: “Even if higher competitiveness for the 
economy as a whole is tied to higher relative productivity…for the most backward 
branches in the economy competitiveness still relies on deep wage-devaluation and 
employment-precarization.” (Féliz 2012, 117) In this way, the neoliberal project in 
Argentina was aided, indeed fueled by, a system of deflated wages and employment that 
could be easily terminated. 
Following the 2001 crisis, the state began, and continues to the present day, to 
subscribe to a program of neodevelopmentalist capitalism. Neodevelopmentalism is 
distinct from the two previous major political economies of Argentina in that it features 
aspects of both neoliberal reforms, while maintaining some protections for labor and the 
poor. As Féliz writes, “Neodevelopmentalism has implied a new form of state-
intervention, a different composition of the working classes, and renewed conditions of 
capital accumulation.” (Féliz 2012, 119) Whereas neoliberal reforms in the 1990s 
provided no protections for workers, scant state intervention, and little regulation, 
neodevelopmentalism provides some form of social safety net, while also allowing for 
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continued capital accumulation, even from abroad. However, these protections only exist 
where they can—namely in regulated, formal markets and employment. As mentioned 
before, by the advent of neodevelopmentalism in Argentina, informal labor and work had 
become a significant, expanding, and unruly thorn in the side of the ruling elite. In 2002, 
informal labor accounted for 44% of all people employed in the private sector (Whitson 
2007, 125). Therefore, even though new protections began to materialize for those 
employed in formal work, these benefits weren’t extended to informal work. 
To talk about development in Argentina during the 20th century also means 
comprehending the context, and culturally-specific terminology and concepts that have 
guided the politics behind these different modes of development. The federal government 
of Argentina has gone through numerous changes, coups, and elections that have had a 
significant impact on the direction of development. Different leaders throughout the 
twentieth century pursued various methods towards developing the Argentine economy 
that have ranged widely from protectionist to neoliberal, fiscally conservative to debt-
burdening. Three key presidents played a major role in different systems of development, 
namely: Juan Perón, (1946-1955, 1973-1974) Carlos Menem (1989-1999), and Néstor 
Kirchner (2003-2007). Each president is associated with a particular political ideology 
(correlating to their respective governments’ policies) named after them, as well: 
Peronismo, Menemismo, and Kirchnerismo. Defining the differences between these helps 
to shed light on the nature and direction of contemporary political economy discourse in 
Argentina, and amongst Argentinian politicians and national leaders. 
Juan Domingo Perón was president of Argentina during separate terms that 
spanned three different decades, and left a considerable legacy on the country. His style 
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of leadership has widely been regarded as authoritarian, in line with traditional leaders in 
Argentinian history: “a charismatic strongman leading from the front.” (Wylde 2011, 
440) However, Perón won continuing favor with the public by appealing to populist 
sentiments through his engagement and alliance with the urban working class. Much of 
Argentina’s development under Perón was guided by Dependency Theory principles, 
which sought to shed any outside, unequal economic influence from developing nations. 
As such, the majority of companies during Perón governance were nationalized, and 
heavy tariffs put on imports from countries like the United Kingdom or the United States. 
Perón also maintained close ties to labor unions, ensuring that regulated workers would 
receive high salaries. Moreover, Perón policies emphasized an explicit social contract 
between the people and the state, that mandated economic wellbeing rather than just 
political or civil freedom. Social programs were aimed at maintain a healthy middle class, 
rather than providing a safety net that only rescues the most vulnerable. Peronismo was 
therefore able to attract a wide swath of the Argentine electorate, including labor unions, 
the urban working class, and some of the bourgeoisie. However, as Perón primarily 
conceptualized of workers as urban dwellers, rural workers, the poorest demographic, 
received little, if any, of the social benefits afforded to their urban counterparts. 
During Carlos Menem’s presidency during the 1990s, Argentina shifted away 
drastically from this model of development. Instead, Menemismo represented a more 
neoliberal approach, aimed at resolving the rampant inflation caused by Peronismo’s 
most protectionist policies. Initially, Menem was elected on a Peronist platform, 
celebrating many of Peronismo ideals during his campaign. However, upon assuming the 
presidency Menem reversed his position. Encouraged by the International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF) and other transnational financial organizations, Menem pursued an aggressive 
privatization agenda. Whereas the state under Peronismo had been regarded as the arbiter 
of economic and social justice, (at least in theory) “…it came to be seen as the principal 
obstacle to development, responsible for both crisis and stagnation.”   (Wylde 2011, 444) 
Instead of guiding the economy from the helm of the state, Menem sought to let free 
markets—both domestically and internationally—deliver prosperity for Argentina. Many 
of the previously state-owned enterprises were sold off, including the postal system, the 
national airline, water, gas, and trains companies, etc. Much of the social programs 
initiated under Perón were cut or drastically downsized, thereby removing any kind of 
effective social safety net. The power of labor unions was also drastically reduced, and 
labor laws rewritten to allow for easier hiring and firing of employees, thereby 
deregulating the labor market and also “…[increasing] the precariousness of 
employment.” (Wylde 2011, 445) Even as Menem bettered issues like food security 
during his tenure, the crisis of unemployment reached an apex during his presidency. In 
her study of grassroots political and economic movements in Argentina, Nancy Powers 
observed “…joblessness reached levels unknown in modern Argentine history.” (Powers 
2001, 2) Despite this, Menem sought to make Argentina attractive to lucrative foreign 
business, but in doing so, tied Argentina more closely to the highs and lows of 
“speculative flows of financial capital.” (Wylde 2011, 445) 
Following Argentina’s 2001 economic crisis, Nestor Kirchner sought to rebuild 
Argentina’s economy to be more active and respected in an international context, while 
also preventing another devastating financial collapse. According to Wylde, “Argentina’s 
relations with international capital have fundamentally changed under Kirchner.” (Wylde 
20
2011, 447) In attempting to do so, Kirchner’s political movement Kirchnerismo 
combined aspects of both Peronismo and Menemismo in that Kirchnerismo exhibits 
characteristics of both financial austerity and populist social-democracy. Whereas Perón 
was suspicious of all foreign investment and exports, Kirchner’s model of development 
relied heavily on Argentina’s export economy, and also promoted free trade guided by 
state management. However, Kirchner did not promulgate the same platitudes that 
Menem awarded to international and domestic finance. Menem’s presidency saw actual 
institutional links between finance and the government—employees who worked in his 
administration and the central bank, etc. Comparatively, Kirchner often consulted with 
the financial sector, but overall his policies served to de-emphasize the importance of the 
Argentina’s financial sector in favor of industrial production for export. In this way, 
Kirchner’s administration sought to keep Argentina’s economy integrated into the global 
market economy while maintaining protections for a few industries, while also 
dismantling the connection between social rights and citizenship that Peronismo had 
established. Wylde refers to this approach as neodevelopmentalism, “through a strategy 
of growth based on selective protectionism and targeted state intervention to facilitate 
macroeconomic stability and economic growth…” (Wylde 2011, 449) Due to the effects 
on the distribution of wealth that is produced by neodevelopmentalist policies, this kind 
of political economy that Argentina has adopted in the 21st century has had profound 
effects on where people decide to live or not live, and has been hugely consequential to 
the income disparity evident in Argentina’s urban centers. 
In these ways, the instability and unequal distribution of wealth wrought by 
neoliberal development in Argentina played a key role in the creation of an unequal, 
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center-periphery spatial relationship between Buenos Aires and the provinces, the center 
of cities and rural hinterlands, and Argentina with the Global North. Economic insecurity 
and informal work have fluctuated wildly in Argentina during the past fifty years, having 
been remarkably low prior to the military coup of 1976 to remarkably high during the 
1980s, but the implementation of economic policies pursued during the Menem 
administration and subsequent governments significantly hastened their ascendancy 
following the 2001 financial crisis. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
THE CENTER VERSUS THE PERIPHERY:
INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARGENTINE URBAN AREAS 
The various cultural, economic, and social landscapes of Argentina can appear 
jarring and disjointed to the casual foreign observer, even when hailing from a nation 
where regionalism and unequally concentrated capital have created vast disparities in 
wealth and welfare. I recall one particular bus trip I took between Buenos Aires, near the 
Atlantic coast, to Mendoza, at the foot of the Andes near the border with 
Chile—essentially crossing the width of the country—that was particularly representative 
of this phenomenon. The trip was over 12 hours, and we drove through the night. Even 
though it was dark, I distinctly remember seeing few signs of human settlement during 
that night. We made occasional stops, but more or less there was only the open pampa, 
the plains in the center of the country that created Argentina’s vast agricultural wealth. 
Like many regions in Argentina, this broad interior of the country is sparsely 
populated, save for the occasional urban center.  As Argentina has gone through various 
stages of development—from extractive processes borne during the 19th century to more 
nationalistic and protectionist policies of the Peronist era to attempting to integrate into a 
post-industrial, global economic system—the economic influence and prominence of 
Argentina’s regions has ebbed and flowed, but has always been primarily focused 
towards providing for the needs of the federal capital, and of valuable foreign capital. 
Thus, while neoliberal logical would position contemporary Argentina’s greater 
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concentrations of wealth and urban population as signs of economic growth, intra-
provincial dynamics and uneven development have created a complex web of urban 
networks consisting of the primary city, Buenos Aires, with various secondary, provincial 
urban nodes and even less populous tertiary settlements. As extractive economic practices 
begin to play a larger role in the national economy again, these secondary and tertiary 
cities have taken on new roles vital to the productivity of the entire system, while relying 
heavily on particular industries for their self-sufficiency. 
In this chapter, I will briefly look to the history of urban development and 
settlement in Argentina, while discussing more in depth the regional dynamics that this 
Figure 1. Argentine Provinces 
(Lende and Velázquez 2014)
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history created, as well as the current dynamics of Argentina’s urban system. Primarily I 
have found that while development practices during the later 20th century created highly 
concentrated centers of economic importance such as Buenos Aires and other important 
provincial capitals, increasing socioeconomic disparities and changing structural 
conditions during the 1990s and 2000s have reorganized patterns of urban agglomeration, 
leading to what Velázquez terms “demetropolitization,” or in other words, the dispersal 
of technological and industrial development to suburban and exurban areas, as well as 
smaller urban agglomeration with specific economic niches. Furthermore, the resurgence 
of extractive economies like agribusiness production, tourism, and mining have stratified 
these smaller cities even more. 
Due to this it’s easy to understand why, up until Perón’s urban welfare programs 
of the mid-20th century, Argentines largely conceptualized of themselves nostalgically as 
a rural nation, perceived as serving as a breadbasket to the world. Cohen says that 
Argentines, “[romanticized] the pampa and its productive potential…two hundred years 
of development reinforced the perceived dichotomy between the country’s rural character 
and its agricultural wealth and the reality of Argentina being a country in which over 80 
percent of its population lives in urban areas.” (Cohen 2012, 133) Yet, as Cohen points 
out, this perception is deceiving and not entirely accurate in the present. In fact, the vast 
majority of Argentines live in cities, and urban economies account for about 70% of GDP 
(Cohen 2012, 134). The regional dynamics of Argentina are important to consider when 
thinking about the development of the country as a whole, as well as when considering 
inequalities inherent in that development. There are many visibly obvious divides in 
Argentine society: rural vs urban, core vs periphery, poor vs rich, etc. 
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Argentina as a whole can be divided into three major geographic regions, 
corresponding to similar geographies and climate, as well as in their productive potential 
and demographic patterns. In the south at the southern tip of South America, provinces 
like Santa Cruz and Chubut are cold, subarctic regions that don’t have huge agricultural 
potential, but features rich deposits of oil and minerals (Cohen 2012, 136). The central 
regions are the nation’s breadbasket, estimated in 2008 to potentially produce food for 
450 million people (Cohen 2012, 149). Major capital producing agriculture and food 
production include soya, wheat, and beef in this region, accounting for the vast majority 
of Argentina’s domestic food supply as well as its international exports, vitally important 
to the extraction economy. In the north and northwest, nine provinces are located in the 
subtropical and/or arid regions of the Andes. As such, their productive agricultural 
potential is significantly less than the central region, nor do they have the same mineral 
deposits of the south. As Cohen explains, “While rural, and in most cases highly 
agricultural, the natural quality of the land in the more mountainous provinces limits 
productivity and income.” (Cohen 2012, 137) This region consists of the nine provinces 
of Jujuy, Salta, Tucuman, Catamarca, Santiago del Estero, Chaco, Misiones, Formosa, 
and Corrientes (Cohen 2012, 136). Moreover, the north of the country features 
significantly a higher percentage of indigenous peoples, young people, and people living 
below the national poverty line. Whereas the percentage of individuals living below the 
poverty line nationwide was 23.4% in 2007, in these nine provinces it is 38.8% (Cohen 
2012, 137).
These regional differences and divergences have come about as the result of 
Argentina’s long colonial history, stretching back to the 16th century. The first true urban 
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centers that were established in what was to become Argentina were founded by Spanish 
conquistadors and settlers, with the primary goal of military domination of indigenous 
populations and strategic control of resources for extraction. Many of Argentina’s major 
urban hubs were founded by Spanish colonials during the early period of colonization, 
such as Santiago del Estero (1533), Buenos Aires (1535), San Juan and Mendoza (1563), 
Tucumán (1565), Córdoba and Sante Fe (1573), Salta (1582), and Jujuy and La Rioja 
(1591) (Velázquez 13). Radically different to indigenous settlement prior to European 
contact, these newly established centers of power were strictly regulated and designed. 
As Lende and Velázquez say, “Sites of Spanish military and political control, these cities 
became instrument of conquest, expansion, and domination. The so-called Leyes de 
Indias—that indicated the factors to consider in electing the sites of colonial 
cities—imposed the typical regular or checkerboard city plan, determined the geometry 
of streets, the location of religious and public institutions, and the distribution of other 
functions.” (Lende and Velázquez 2014, 15) During this period, these urban centers 
accounted for a relatively small percentage of national and provincial populations. 
However, the colonial characteristics of their founding underline how Argentina’s urban 
system was built out of a political-economic structure that derived its power from 
domination, exploitation, and top-down management. In this way, cities in Argentina 
expanded and developed out of an explicitly colonial past designed for military power 
and extraction. 
As Argentina rapidly expanded economically and demographically during the 19th 
and 20th centuries, regional urban centers became hubs for extractive economic activity 
that flowed towards Buenos Aires, the coast, and the international market in Europe and 
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North America. As such, cities became more and more economically, socially, and 
culturally important to the emerging nation. Between 1869 and 1914, Argentina’s 
population increased six-fold while the percentage of the population living in urban areas 
increased to 53% (Bacigalupo 1969, Lende and Velázquez 2014, 15). However, at the 
same time the northeast became less important economically, while cities in the 
agriculturally-productive pampa exploded. As the 20th century unfolded and 
industrialization and mechanization became the primary means of economic expansion, 
these dynamics again began to shift when massive labor forces migrated away from the 
rural hinterlands of Argentina towards important industrial centers. For the first time in 
Argentine history, this process radically changed the organization of space and wealth for 
a vast majority of Argentines. Lende and Velázquez say, “…large masses of the rural 
population turned towards the principal manufacturing centers, especially Buenos Aires, 
Rosario and Córdoba, where the substitution of imports drained the interior of the country 
of a scarcely qualified labor force and with a low cost of production. The city, then, 
transformed into a hegemonic model of socio-spatial organization.” (Lende and 
Velázquez 2014, 16) In other words, the process of reassigning labor from agricultural, 
rural work towards easily reproducible factory work created a prescribed and stratified 
living environment. By virtue of this shift, the ratio of the population living in rural vs 
urban areas drastically shifted during the 20th century, as well as the relative size of the 
central metropolis, greater Buenos Aires, with the rest of the country’s urban centers. In 
the 16th century, the urban population only accounted for at most 10% of total, and 
remained low until industrialization. By 1960, 72% of the national population lived in 
urban agglomerations, while Buenos Aires ballooned in size to 10 times the size of the 
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next largest urban area (Lende and Velázquez 2014, 16). By 1980 during the military 
dictatorship and the advent of neoliberal restructuring of the economy, the percentage of 
the population in urban areas increased even more to 83%. 
During the most contemporary period, from the neoliberal restricting of the 9180s 
and 1990s towards a neodevelopmentalist model of the 2000s and present day, Velázquez 
tells us that both process that he terms respectively ‘metropolization’ and 
‘demetropolization’ have had important impacts on the patterns of urbanization in 
Argentina and their respective inequalities. Whereas metropolization refers to: x
“the relative expansion and increase in number of national metropolises 
(10,000,000 inhabitants or more), secondary metropolises (1,000,000 to 
10,000,000 inhabitants), and regional metropolises (500,000 to 1,000,00 
inhabitants),” demetropolization refers to, “the phenomenon of 
concentrated urbanization—the increase in number of ‘medium cities’ 
(100,000 to 500,000 inhabitants)—and agglomerated 
urbanization—increase in the population and number of nuclei that 
oscillate between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants.” (Lende and Velázquez 
2014, 12) 
Although these concepts seem to be diametrically opposed, in actuality both accelerated 
dramatically during this period of development, happening in tandem. Globalization and 
neoliberal structural qualities have created an increasingly interconnected economy, 
where seemingly insignificant geographies and economies relate to the regional, national, 
and international scale. As the intense multiplication of dense urban cores created by 
metropolization have brought about “post-industrial production” in the form of 
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specialized services like finance and other high-intelligence service sectors, 
demetropolization correlates to the increasingly fragmented and stratified nature of 
industrial and agricultural production, thereby leading to demetropolization. Therefore, 
while urban areas increased in relative size, i.e. metropolization, so, too did the number 
of smaller, lesser cities throughout different regions of Argentina, i.e. demetropolization. 
Proponents of neoliberal development have pointed to this growth in Argentina’s 
central urban economy as evidence of the positive economic growth of the country. 
While this is certainly a part of the story, such a view occludes some of the negative 
impacts of these developments. Recent studies in urban geography have shown that 
Figure 2. Size of Urban Areas in 
Argentina
 (Lende and Velázquez 2014)
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economic growth and the primacy of one city in a country don’t have a direct correlation 
with economic success, especially in developing nations and the global south (Frick et al. 
157). Whereas urban primacy has been shown to benefit the economy of relatively high-
income countries, data suggests that this is not true for countries in different stages of 
development, Argentina included. Furthermore, Frick and Pose suggests that studies of 
urban primacy alone do not account for important demographic changes, many of which 
have not been experienced before. They say:
“Most literature uses either levels of primacy i.e. the concentration of a 
country’s urban population in the largest city or the share of population in 
cities living in cities above a certain size threshold as indicators of urban 
concentration…however, [they] only imperfectly portray the historical 
shifts occurring in many countries: the share of the population in cities of 
a certain size has little to say about the relative distribution of the urban 
population; and primacy only depicts changes in the largest city and the 
overall size of the urban population.” (Frick et al. 2018, 157)
In other words, Frick et al. propose a new methodological paradigm for understanding 
primacy and urban development in the Global South. Although urban primacy can be 
beneficial economically for high income nations, their study finds that lower income 
countries don’t necessarily benefit from primacy in the same ways. 
They continue that “countries may increasingly benefit from concentration if the 
strongest sectors of their economy tend to benefit more from agglomeration 
externalities.” (Frick et al. 2018, 165) Here, “externalities” refers to the associated, but 
unintentional, consequences of particular commercial activities within a specific cultural, 
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social, and/or economic context. For example, the casual exchange of information 
amongst tech employees working in the same city yet for different companies may 
constitute an externality within that industry and city. Countries that feature more 
developed economies that have strong sectors in finance, high technology, or knowledge-
intensive industries will inherently benefit more by virtue of urban concentration as 
opposed to more industrial or mechanical ones. Conversely, economies that don’t feature 
these highly developed fields will tend to feel the negative effects of hyper-competition 
when placed into an agglomerate situation. Moreover, they conclude that in the Global 
South, “…urban structure seems to place second fiddle—if at all—to a raft of other 
factors which are the real determinants of economic growth.” (Frick et al. 2018, 165) Put 
differently, it isn’t to say that urban structures don’t play an important role in the quality 
of life and welfare of people living in developing nations, but rather, high urban 
concentration can’t be used as an indicator of economic success in developing countries, 
as many other aspects of a country’s economic structure play important role in economic 
development. Consequentially, only looking to the growth and issues of Greater Buenos 
Aires can’t necessarily contribute to a fuller understanding of Argentina’s urban system 
as a whole, as it only accounts for a part of the overall urban development of the nation. 
Completely left out of this equation are the medium cities and smaller urban 
agglomeration which Velazquez refers to previously. 
Although these regional differences have come about as the result of long 
histories of respective development and underdevelopment, investment and neglect, the 
policies of the past 30 years have made these differences especially pronounced, in part 
due to the lack of utility the north and northwest for an international market, as well as 
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the deindustrialization of the major urban centers, like Buenos Aires. Beginning as early 
as 1960, 
“the resident population in the Federal Capital began to decrease, by virtue 
of the phenomenon of gentrification—the nucleus of metropolitan space 
appropriated to house commercial, financial, and service oriented 
activities, shifting residential uses toward peripheral areas; the classical 
metropolitan morphology…gave way to a pattern of reticular growth, 
defined by irregular and diffuse borders.” (Lende and Velázquez 2014, 17)
Despite outwardly appearing disjointed and unrelated, this process of displacement and 
redefining formerly concrete delimitation between residential and industrial, urban and 
exurban, etc., bears relevance to structural aspects elsewhere in the Argentine economy. 
In fact, the two processes as inextricably linked. As the process of metropolization 
occurred in Greater Buenos Aires that facilitated the high concentration of the service-
oriented economy as well as the displacement of the working class and less knowledge-
intensive industries, demetropolization facilitated a context in which economic activity, 
and therefore people, became geographically stratified throughout the nation, in regional 
networks that are both connected and not. Lende and Velázquez continue, 
“On one hand, [this process] imposes on the rest of the territory hegemonic ways 
of doing, even as it is endowed with some autonomy in terms of its place within 
the economic system; on the other hand, it tends to separate and disconnect from 
the national space.” (Lende and Velázquez 2014, 23) 
At once, then, traditional urban structures and functions have been disrupted to 
accommodate the reorganization of national urban space in terms favorable for a 
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globalizing political economy. Santos and Silveira term this the “dissolution of the 
metropolis in the territory.” (Santos and Silveira 2001, 253-254) Therefore, as more 
foreign capital facilitated the gentrification of the Federal Capital and displaced working 
class people, the lack of foreign investment forsook other areas of the country. 
While other parts of the country have seen influxes of foreign capital, provinces 
like Jujuy or Catamarca in the north have seen comparatively few. Cohen writes that this 
is due to a lack of attention and utility of this region to international and/or private 
investors. He says: “A big part of this problem has been the dearth of private 
investment… [there are] enormous investments in the south, for example in oil-rich Santa 
Cruz and within the city of Buenos Aires, compared to the north and northwest region.” 
(Cohen 2012, 138) In this way, private capital seems to avoid the northern region, 
thereby leaving those provinces largely behind when considering the growth that has 
been promoted by foreign investment in the rest of Argentina. 
As a result, large amounts of federal aid is directed to “the challenging territories” 
more so than other regions. However, bureaucratic failings as well as inconsistent 
administration of funding has rendered much of this aid inaccessible or unusable. Cohen 
continues that, “Both the magnitude of financials flows to the provinces and their timing 
have varied considerably, resulting in numerous provincial complaints about the 
difficulty of managing programs for which the funds are frequently not available in a 
timely manner…there is little doubt that the institutional arrangements of central 
government transfers to the provinces have weakened provincial and local government 
capacity and performance.” (Cohen 2012, 139) Evidently, the lack of coherent 
coordination between the federal and provincial governments has created a political 
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economic situation in which the developmental needs of these largely impoverished 
provinces are often overlooked and improperly dealt with. Accordingly, these provinces 
tend to rank low in various measures of human capital as well as infrastructure and 
economy. Urban centers in these regions mostly serve as conduits for whatever (if few) 
agribusiness operations in the surrounding region.
While Buenos Aires has always and will most likely continue to be the economic 
heavyweight amongst Argentine urban centers, secondary and tertiary cities play an 
important role in these regional dynamics, and reflect the disparity between the Federal 
Capital and the provinces. Obvious disparities exist between Buenos Aires and its 
suburbs, as well as Buenos Aires and lesser cities throughout the country in terms of 
“disparities in income, access to basic infrastructure, housing quality, and opportunities 
for social mobility.” This dynamic is clearly demonstrated in two case studies I’ve here 
laid forth—one concerning residents of informal settlements within abandoned hotels and 
apartment buildings in Buenos Aires, and one concerning the role social capital played 
for small farmers and local government organizations in the development of a large-scale 
irrigation and social housing project in La Pampa province. 
In Buenos Aires, forces of global capital as previously described have prioritized 
market-driven urban development at the cost of middle and low-income families. 
Through the process of gentrification, neighborhoods of middle and low-incomes 
families are often forced out of their homes after rent increases render these places 
unaffordable, putting these families in a situation of “housing precarity” where eviction, 
and therefore homelessness, is an immediate reality at any time (Muñoz 2017, 1253). 
While some people are forced into villas miserias, others find affordable housing in 
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informal hotels within Buenos Aires, which are abandon or forgotten by their owners, 
often times ruled over by a landlord who may or may not have legal title to the building. 
Although city law mandates housing as a universal right, practices by the state in dealing 
with housing-insecure families and persons demonstrates the unequal power residents 
yield in the face of developers, private entities, and the state itself.
 An example of this can be seen in the “Programa de Atención para Familias en 
Situación de Calle,” a subsidy provided by the Buenos Aires government that allots a 
monthly stipend for families evicted from their housing to find a new place to live. 
Although this subsidy may seem beneficial on the surface, it provides the government an 
avenue for negotiation with and domination of vulnerable families. Muñoz says, 
“On the day of eviction, families must go to the Welfare Office to receive 
the first quota. Afterwards, they can receive a monthly allotment for up to twelve 
months. In order to be eligible, families must be in the house on the day of 
eviction. Later, they must follow a series of procedures to continue to receive the 
subsidy. These procedures and requirements involve a substantial amount of time, 
travel and money, often without any guarantee they will receive the subsidy each 
month.” (Muñoz 2017, 1259)
Whereas the owners of a building can legally demand the eviction of residents by a set 
date, evicted families must jump through bureaucratic hoops that are often logistically 
impossible to complete in order to find new housing. Furthermore, the subsidy provided 
almost never would provide the rent needed to remain in the same area, as development 
and gentrification increase rent. This represents a serious inequality in the agency given 
to these disparate actors. Whereas the government seems ready and willing to help 
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developers evict low-income residents, the processes these residents must go through in 
order to receive a modicum of assistance from the same government fails to recognize the 
impossibility of its procedures. Therefore, while in theory the subsidy is supposed to give 
housing security to its recipients, in practice it barely achieves this, giving the state and 
flows of enormous capital power over poor residents of Buenos Aires. Summarizing this 
point, a leader of a housing rights organization in Buenos Aires said, 
“It is a government with a housing policy of evicting the poor from the city. It is 
the idea of an elitist city, totally liberal, a city for tourists, for real estate 
investments…and the policies the city government has implemented reflect this 
ideology…The only things we can do are collect the subsidy and sometimes 
negotiate it.” (Muñoz 2017, 1259)
While poor urban dwellers experience this type of marginalization at the hands of 
the state, so too do their rural counterparts, for many of the same reasons. (Jacinto and 
Nogar 2012) In a productive region of the Colorado River Valley in northern Patagonia, 
the Argentine federal government and the La Pampa provincial government facilitate an 
irrigation project that began in the 1960s, known as Ente Provincial del Río Colorado 
(EPRC). The goals of the EPRC are to increase the agricultural development of the 
region, which while irrigable, had previously been unproductive. Initially, under policies 
in accordance with principles of Peronismo, the project was originally dedicated to a 
system of collectivized, small farmers who were given subsidies to settle in the area. 
However, by the 1990s when it was clear that this system had not met its intended goals, 
La Pampa province opened up the mandates of the EPRC to include international 
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investment, locating large agribusiness farms directly south of the small farmers.  
Michelini says, 
“During a period of heavy state reforms, which included reduction in 
functions, deregulation, liberalization and privatization and reflected by changes 
to the national and provincial constitutions, La Pampa passed a new Colonization 
Law…to accelerate the occupation of unproductive irrigable land by attracting 
investment, technology and human capital to the area, a strategy based on offering 
plots of land of unlimited areas and the establishment of strong fiscal 
advantages.” (Michelini 2013, 102-3)
As a result, investors, some local and others with no previous relationship to the region, 
entered into this situation, alienating the smaller farmers while simultaneously extracting 
capital. 
The intended purpose of attracting larger-scale production to the EPRC project 
was to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and capital between these huge entities and 
the smaller farmers, supposedly in a mutually beneficial fashion. In reality, however, 
there was little such interaction. In surveys and interviews done with the small farmers in 
the region, Michelini found that 87% said their relationship with agribusiness in the 
region was “indifferent” (Michelini 2013, 105). Farmers remarked there was little 
opportunity to interact with agribusiness in order to facilitate the transfer of ideas and 
technology, as was intended to occur by La Pampa government. Furthermore, 
employment opportunities with agribusiness are scant, as much of their full-time work 
requires a high degree of knowledge, which these companies find from outside of the 
immediate vicinity. Nor does the capital accumulated by these companies return to the 
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region—instead, capital flows outwards towards the national and international market, 
benefitting only the entrepreneurs invested in the companies. This dynamic clearly 
demonstrates two seemingly different, but closely interrelated processes that ascended 
through the state’s relinquishing of regulatory power: at once a homogenization of 
productive activity and fragmentation/marginalization of local communities (Jacinto and 
Nogar 2012, 70).
In these ways, both poor rural and urban residents have suffered from 
marginalization at the hands of a market-led state and international capital. The decay of 
traditional urban structures as well as the hegemony on production and fragmentation in 
social/economic connections has created an economic system that aids the international 
flow of capital away from those who most need it, and into concentrated wealth for the 
wealthiest. As a result, 21st century Argentina finds itself with an incredibly disparate, 




A NEW PLAYER EMERGES: THE RAPID GROWTH OF CHINA IN LATIN 
AMERICA
To speak about Argentina’s relative economic success in the 21st century 
inevitably means talking about its relationship with China. Following the 2001 collapse 
of the Argentine economy, and during the 2008-2009 global recession, Argentina was in 
many ways saved by its positive commodity relationship with China. As Carol Wise says, 
“…I would argue that China’s economic importance to Argentina is far form trivial. It 
was, after all, Chinese demand that breathed new life into the collapsed Argentine 
economy beginning in 2003.” (Wise 2017, 155) In the time since the 2001 crisis, China 
has invested in Latin American Emerging Economies like Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and 
Mexico in ways previously though improbable (Wise 2017). 
Chinese demands for commodities from Latin America like soybeans and crude 
oil have created a dynamic between the region and China that, on the surface, seems to 
resemble past relationships with wealthy countries in the Global North, originally 
criticized by dependency economists like Raúl Prebisch in the 1960s. Accordingly, 
debates in Argentina around the influx of Chinese involvement in the domestic economy 
have largely centered on the fear of developing a new neocolonial relationship based 
around unfavorable dependency on commodity exports and resource extraction.  At the 
same time, rhetoric and debate surrounding Chinese investment in Argentina is often 
contentious, hyper-suspicious, and simplified, even within the highest levels of 
government. 
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In this chapter, I intend to argue that understanding the nature of this south-south 
relationship cannot rely on the dependency theory that described Argentina’s previous 
relationships with northern powers. Such an approach does not account for the changing 
circumstances of the 21st century, the structural differences of the political economy 
approaches, and the nature of China’s goals for investment in the region in relation to its 
own domestic goals. Furthermore, the fact that China is also considered to be part of the 
Global South with development issues as or more complex than those described here in 
Argentina means that this south-south relationship must be defined in contrast to 
traditional global north-global south dependency dynamics. Whereas Argentina’s 
economy was primarily focused on commodities and low-level industrial activity during 
the middle of the 20th century, today the economy is much more complex; it features 
semi-technical manufacturing sectors serving the domestic market and other sophisticated 
features. With this chapter, too, I do not intend to delve deeply into the complexities of 
China’s domestic political economy and its own issues with development, but rather 
provide context for the issues most relevant to the nature of China’s foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Argentina.
As this relates to the pattern of Argentina’s urban network, comprehension of this 
south-south relationship is vital due to the stark difference between Argentina’s urban 
infrastructure during the mid 20th century in comparison to the present day. While rapid 
industrialization maintained the traditional character of urban form and geography during 
pre-neoliberal developments, (i.e. industry, working class, and manufacturing centered in 
urban areas, exurban and rural areas associated only with agriculture and resource 
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extraction) as I have already noted the past 30 years of structural reforms have reshaped 
this pattern. 
Sino-Argentine diplomatic relations can be traced back to cold war dynamics that, 
in many ways, bound China and Latin America together against common global struggles 
during that period. This period set the stage for the economic and developmental 
relationships that can be seen in the 21st century. Modern Chinese relations with Latin 
American nations was borne out of challenging the hegemonic powers of the Cold War, 
particularly that of the United States. Prior to the historic rise of China during the late 20th 
and 21st centuries, the US was effectively able to manipulate most countries in Latin 
America into following its lead in regard to diplomatic (let alone economic) relations 
with China. On this, Jiang says, “…for more than a decade after the PRC was established, 
China was unable to make any diplomatic breakthroughs in Latin America, to some 
extent as a result of US pressure on its southern neighbors to avoid ties with communist 
countries.” (Jiang 2008, 28) However, a notable exception to U.S. pressure forcing other 
nations in its hemisphere to restrict relations with China was the Cuban revolution in 
1959.  This event led the Chinese government to reconsider the ways it could connect 
with a seemingly culturally disparate region of the world. As the first communist 
government in the Western hemisphere, Cuba became the first Latin American country to 
officially recognize China’s sovereignty and establish diplomatic relations. Quickly, it 
became clear that Latin America was “the battleground of the United States and the 
Soviet Union in their competition for hegemony.” (Jiang 2008, 29) 
As the cold war became more intense and precarious, China began to express its 
support for any Latin American nations that confronted U.S. control of the hemisphere, or 
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experienced forceful, violent action by the United States—including Nicaragua, the 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Chile. With growing influence, China advocated 
for a redevelopment of global dynamics to include to uplift of nations in the “third 
world,” or the global south. More so than leaders in the US and Europe, the Chinese 
government understood the unequal relationship between north and south. In 1972 during 
a visit by Mexican President Luis Echeverría, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai remarked that:
“Latin America is emerging on the world stage with a new face…The Chinese 
government and the Chinese people firmly support the just struggle of Latin 
American people and believe that a united Latin America, through its struggle, 
will win a greater victory over the expansionary influence of imperialism [in the 
form of] new and old colonialism.” (Jiang 2008, 29)
There are two concurrent themes in this quote by Zhou that make clear China’s intention 
and positionality within the cold war, and with respect to how it saw its relationship with 
other countries of the global south. First, its clear that China placed its own 
developmental struggles within a global context of western hegemony, thereby linking 
the hardships faced by far-flung nations with its own. Second, in referring to “the 
expansionary influence of imperialism,” Zhou is plainly criticizing American influence 
and involvement in Latin America, calling upon a familiar history for Latin Americans of 
exploitation and marginalization, stretching back to the western founding of these nation-
states. In this way, cold war politics and global-order restructuring brought a new-found 
understanding and amicability between China and Latin America, and as I will examine, 
a close economic relationship with Argentina in particular. 
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Undoubtedly, the People’s Republic of China has had an astronomical rise to 
power during the 21st century. Once considered severely underdeveloped, China has 
undergone a radical transformation that has created an incredible national infrastructural 
system including hundreds of newly built cities, expansion on existing urban centers, 
higher salaries and better quality of life measures, and technological advancements that 
rival and surpass those achieved by Western countries. Wise and Myers point out many 
of the metrics by which this assumption can be ascertained: 
“From its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, its surpassing 
Japan to become the world’s second largest economy, its first place ranking 
amongst the emerging economies (EEs) as destination for foreign direct 
investment (FDI), its emergence as the top exporter to world markets, and the 
designation of reserve-currency status for the Chinese yuan at the International 
Monetary Fund, Chinas has jumped over formidable economic hurdles more 
quickly than any other developing country—ever.” (Wise and Myers 2017, 1)
As demonstrated by these figures, by almost any measure the Chinese economy has 
grown at unprecedented rates during the first two decades of the 2000s. Correspondingly, 
the domestic demand for goods and services in China has skyrocketed, and in many 
sectors of the economy this has resulted in likewise unprecedented growth in outward 
Chinese FDI by both state-owned enterprises and private companies into other areas of 
the Global South, in other developing nations to meet the demand of the emerging 
domestic market for manufactured and complex goods.
However, it is important to note that many of these foreign investments are not 
made at the explicit direction of the Chinese government nor are they part of a 
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clandestine operation to gain global control, as is often suggested by Western and Latin 
American media and politicians. Instead, says Creutzfeldt, China’s foreign policy 
objectives are primarily rooted in its historical domestic policy concerns: 
“As [China] matures into this role [as a major protagonist on the global stage], its 
identity and actions are shaped by its own history and aspirations: its history as a 
humiliated power after the middle of the nineteenth century, the concurrent fear of 
losing control over its sovereign territory, and a deeply felt urge to regain 
influence. It could be said that China’s core concerns are with social stability, 
national sovereignty, and steady consumption.” (Creutzfeldt 2017, 16)
Therefore, from the Chinese perspective its relationship with Latin America and more 
specifically Argentina is not borne out of a desire to control the international economic 
system and that of Argentina, but rather to satisfy the nation’s ever-expanding internal 
needs for material and socioeconomic security and independence from foreign influence. 
In summation, what this means is that the outpouring of Chinese capital is primarily a 
result of the country’s desire to modernize and compete with the most developed nations 
on a global scale. Summarizing this view, Creutzfeldt adds that this is evidenced in 
China’s hallmark “five year plans” that lay out the government’s policy objectives every 
five years. He remarks that, “…the priorities presented in these documents make clear 
that China’s domestic concerns and requirements trump all foreign policy objectives.” 
(Creutzfeldt 2017, 17)
Coincidentally, China’s emergence on to the global stage as a major power 
corresponded well temporarily with the economic collapse of Argentina in 2001. During 
that time, the Chinese government initiated a series of diplomatic relationships with 
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countries in Latin America that had not previously existed. For example, President Jiang 
Zemin made visits to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Mexico in 
2001 and 2002, while subsequent president Hu Jintao made trip to Brazil, Argentina, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba and Peru in 2004 and 2008 (Creutzfeldt 18). With an eye for 
emerging markets looking for alternatives to previously catastrophic Western investment 
and trade partnerships, China was well positioned from an international context to 
persuade this variety of Latin American governments to create new trade partnerships 
that would be supposedly mutual beneficial. In 2008, the Chinese government published 
a document entitled, “Policy Paper on Latin America and the Carribean,” which followed 
suit from similar papers the government had released on the European Union (2003) and 
Africa (2006) (Creutzfeldt 2017, 18). In this document, the government laid out its 
official vision for its relationship with the region, and the ways it saw the two could 
benefit from another. Broadly speaking, the paper seeks to paint an amicable, mutually 
trusting relationship between China and Latin America: 
“Though China and Latin America and the Caribbean are far from each 
other, the two peoples enjoy a time-honored friendship. The two sides are at a 
similar stage of development and face the common task of achieving 
development. Both sides cherish the desire for greater mutual understanding and 
closer cooperation… Friendly cooperation between China and Latin America and 
the Caribbean serves the fundamental interest of the two peoples. Future growth 
of relationship between the two sides enjoys great potential and broad prospects, 
and will contribute more significantly to peace and development of mankind.” 
(State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2008)
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Here, the Chinese government utilizes much of the positive rhetoric surrounding south-
south trade and diplomatic relations. Although arguably even at the turn of the 21st 
century China was more positively poised to grow rapidly in the coming years, the 
attitude of the paper remains extremely positive in relating how the stage of development 
in China and Latin America is at a very similar point. Furthermore, they maintain that 
friendly cooperation and understanding will only better this relationship. Later in the 
document, the realms in which this friendship are to be carried out are further identified 
by the Chinese government, which it defines as political, economic, cultural-social, and 
“peace, security, and judicial affairs.” (State Council of the PRC 2008) Broadly defined, 
the Chinese government saw this relationship as mutually beneficial by playing to each 
nation’s respective strengths.
From an Argentine point of view, this relationship is more fraught than Chinese 
government officials would like the global community to think. Some of these concerns 
are wrapped into racist and xenophobic tendencies that reject foreign influence, while 
others incorrectly equate heightened Chinese influence with a new form of colonial 
relations between a world power and a less developed nation, while also inflating the 
level of involvement of Chinese capital in certain sectors of the economy. 
However, it is undoubtable that China may very well be in the process of taking 
advantage of the structural inequalities and weaknesses inherent in Argentina’s political 
economy, whether wittingly or not. Whereas the dependency that was formed between 
Argentina and western powers during the 19th and 20th centuries often depended on 
explicit directives from foreign powers to behave and create policy that benefited this 
system and not Argentines or the nation as a whole, China’s advancement in Argentina 
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has largely been not as coordinated as western sensibility would predict. In part, this has 
been driven by the market reforms that have opened up the expansion of private capital 
within China as well as without. Creutzfeldt remarks, 
“It would be…misleading to consider China as a unitary actor: while Beijing 
promotes and reinforces the view of its principled, centrally guided approach, it 
has also been boosting outward global activity by its state-owned and private 
companies, through its Going Out strategy, occasioning a growing diversity of 
types of engagement. As a consequence, China’s unifying rhetoric…is echoed by 
a deafening din of splintered voices.” (Creutzfeldt 2017, 16) 
In other words, Creutzfeldt points out that the influx of Chinese capital in Argentina and 
Latin America isn’t the result of unified, centralized directives handed down from the 
Chinese premier. Rather, a complex web of both private enterprise and state-owned 
agencies have chosen particular projects and areas in which to invest. Although this 
distinction must be made, nonetheless the impact on the Argentine economy has been 
dramatic.
As example of how Chinese capital have transformed the economic landscape of 
Argentina is in the financial sector. As a result of defaulting on debt financed by Western 
institutions during the 2001 crisis, Argentina found itself locked out of many traditional 
lending agencies in the Global North. Development Banks and other financiers like the 
International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, either flat out 
refused to take on Argentina’s case, or offered up astronomical interest rates that 
Argentina would never recover from. On the other hand, Chinese development banks 
have offered loans at commercial rates to Argentine organizations without many of the 
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political and development stipulations of western lenders, instead tying loans to promises 
of goods purchases and infrastructure developments. As a result, the interest rates offered 
by Chinese firms is often more desirable to nations like Argentina. Gallagher and Irwin 
explain that:
“These lower interest rates allow nations with little access to global capital 
markets to borrow when they cannot afford the interest rates charged by the 
private market. Argentina and Ecuador have had difficulty accessing global credit 
markets given that they defaulted on their sovereign debt in 2001 and 2008-09, 
respectively.” (Gallagher and Irwin 2017, 63).
As a result, as of 2017, Chinese finance in Latin America exceeds that of the World 
Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the United States Export-Import Bank per 
year (Gallagher and Irwin 2017, 51). 
Also of note is that both of China’s largest lenders in Latin America, China 
Development Bank (CDB) and the China Export-Import Bank (China Ex-Im) are state 
owned enterprises with explicit direction the carry out the government’s policy 
objectives. Primarily these banks focus on well defined development projects that 
improve the extractive infrastructure available for Chinese use in partner countries, as 
well as China’s macroeconomic goals (Gallagher and Irwin 2017, 52). Specifically, CBD 
has been directed to carry out projects and loans dedicated to electricity, road 
construction, railways, petroleum, coal, postal services and telecommunications, 
agriculture, and public infrastructure whereas China Ex-Im bank is in charge of importing 
and exporting high tech mechanical and electronic products, and to assist Chinese 
business with leveraging the relative advantages in the international market (i.e., 
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choosing where to invest).  Whereas lending from Western sources historically included 
policy stipulations, the structure of Chinese investment doesn’t include these same kind 
of stipulations, but rather, their vertical investment in a multitude of processes gives 
Chinese firms, public and private, significant leverage over host country’s policy 
decisions, but in a different way than Western lenders. Again, Gallagher and Irwin 
illuminate this dynamic: 
“When foreign governments have threatened the Chinese government 
economically, the Chinese government has retaliated using entirely separate 
economic means. For example, when Argentina filed anti-dumping lawsuits 
against Chinese manufacturing products, China cut off imports of products like 
soy, oil, and beef. Argentina withdrew its anti-dumping cases and the imports 
resumed.” (Gallagher and Irwin 2017, 63)
Indeed, although both nations identify as part of the struggle of the poorer global South, 
there exists here an uneven dynamic where China can sway domestic policy in foreign 
nations. While there are no explicit policies that China is advocating as agencies like the 
World Bank did during the 1990s when they pushed neoliberal restructuring, this 
example clearly demonstrates that through potentially lucrative yet extractive trade and 




NEUQUEN PROVINCE’S CHINESE SPACE STATION: A CASE STUDY
Within domestic politics in Argentina, Chinese investment is a highly contentious 
topic that draws into its discussion many of the foundations of Argentine political 
economy—its neodevelopmentalist model of capital expansion, the center-periphery 
dynamic between Buenos Aires and the provinces, and national autonomy in front of a 
potentially hegemonic world power. Debates range from the common, everyday all the 
way up to the highest levels of Argentine government. During the mid 2010s, the 
Argentine congress debated various aspects of the nation’s involvement with China and 
China’s influence over the direction of the nation. One such episode, which has also been 
reported in depth by The New York Times is over the controversial Chinese Moon 
Exploration Program, which established a Chinese-military operated space observation 
center in the Patagonian province of Neuquén. Through this episode, members of the 
Argentine senate expressed opinions that ranged from outright skepticism, to 
acquiescence, to celebration. This moment is of particular importance in understanding 
the dynamics between China’s developmental model for the region and domestic 
Argentine political economy. 
The Chinese-run space station in Patagonia has been a contentious project from 
the start. In some political factions and localities in Argentina, Chinese involvement in 
local economies had already raised concern, as demonstrated by the pushback from a 
Chinese agribusiness investment in Rio Negro province (La Nación 2011). However, 
according to The New York Times the space station represents, “one of the most striking 
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symbols of Beijing’s long push to transform Latin America and shape its future for 
generations to come.” The Chinese government and Argentine politicians who have 
backed projects like these touted the space station as the physical representation of a 
harmonious relationship that would aid China’s burgeoning space program while 
bringing economic development to Neuquén province. 
The project began in 2012, under secret negotiations between the Chinese 
government and Neuquén provincial government. The base is part of larger network of 
stations that China has established across the globe in an effort to expand its rapidly 
growing and well-endowed space program. The program has lofty goals including 
exploring the Moon and even Mars. Urdinez et al. speak to the nature of this ongoing 
project: 
“…China established the so-called China Deep Space Network, a series of 
monitoring stations in order to support various space missions as the planet 
rotates. This project, by its very nature, enhances China’s global capabilities in 
science and military fields. China needs strategically-located stations in various 
parts of the world, and the Patagonian region in Argentina proved to have correct 
geographical conditions…” (Urdinez et al. 2018, 4) 
Despite its obvious military, security, and surveillance capabilities, under the agreement 
the two parties reached the Chinese are not to use the station for military purposes. 
However, built into this condition is that the Chinese government was also awarded the 
land on which the station was built rent-free, for 50 years. Despite immediate resistance 
to the project at the local and national level (Neuquén provincial lawmaker Betty 
Kreitman was quoted by The New York Times saying, “Surrendering sovereignty in your 
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own country is shameful,” in reference to favorable tax breaks the Chinese project 
received), planning moved forward. 
In April of 2014, the Neuquén legislature approved a law that established the tax 
breaks for the land rent and “a relaxation of immigration rules for Chinese officials 
involved with the project.” (Urdinez et al. 2018) In December of the same year, the 
Argentine Senate approved the agreement. Among other features, Neuquén province 
allowed a tax exemption for the Chinese company tasked with constructing the space 
station (China Harbour Engineering Company), and exempted the China National Space 
Agency (CNSA) from customs duties and internal taxes. (Urdinez et al. 2018) These 
advantageous conditions comes within the context of Argentina and China’s intensifying 
economic relationship post-2001, as I’ve described above. The Neuquén space station is a 
perfect example of how increased Chinese economic activity has also resulted in the 
implementation of policies, from a national down to a local level, that are generally 
favorable to Chinese capital. Additionally, it’s notable to compare the CNSA project in 
Neuquén with a similar project completed by the European Space Agency (ESA). 
Whereas the ESA project was completed for US$36 million, CNSA’s project cost 
US$300 million, clearly showing the economic priority, more so than western powers, 
China has given to Argentina. China’s quantifiably higher investment is a clear reversal 
from previous trends, which saw Western powers like the United States and Spain as 
predatory investors subject to domestic skepticism in Argentina.
The different political factions within Argentina have advocated for accordingly 
different strategies in the nation’s interaction with Chinese capital and influence. 
Primarily, the most obvious differences exist between Peronist aligned politicians and 
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non-Peronist politicians who are advocating for increased Chinese FDI and greater 
skepticism of Chinese intent, respectively. During the 1980s and 1990s, the neoliberal 
governments, especially that of Menem, strongly encouraged trading ties with the United 
States and the Western world, which as stated, were often done through western 
development organizations and lending agencies like the World Bank and IMF. Prior to 
Chinese involvement, Argentina’s largest trading partners were the US, the UK, and 
Brazil (Urdinez et al. 2018). 
Following the disaster of the 2001 crisis, subsequent Argentina leaders sought to 
distance themselves from US and global north influences. The Kirchners and supporters 
of Kirchnerismo began to see China’s enthusiasm for Latin America as an opportunity to 
do just that, while also strengthening the bonds between nations in global south behind 
perceived common struggles. Urdinez et al. continue on later to say that, “Latin American 
countries embraced the rhetoric of South-South relations, advanced to a considerable 
extent by China itself, as a way to increase their autonomy from the US.” Furthermore, 
they importantly note that, “The concept of autonomy, particularly towards the US, is 
essential for understanding the foreign policies of Latin American countries.” (Urdinez et 
al. 2018) In this way, the Argentine government’s fairly broad acceptance of Chinese 
capital and influence can be understood to be in reaction to previously detrimental 
relationships with Western, Northern nations and within the context of South-South 
solidarity. 
Within specific debates in the Argentine congress about the space station, several 
recurrent themes reappear and center the political debate about Chinese FDI and the role 
it should play in the country. Urdinez et al. observed three major components that have 
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guided Argentine understanding and perspective on the space station, cooperation with 
China, and how FDI should factor into Argentina’s economy more generally. They found 
that the historically hegemony of the United States in Latin America and Argentina was 
projected onto China and Argentina’s relationship, that debates about center-periphery 
inequality and the role of FDI more generally were also projected as primarily an issue 
with China, and finally that there seems to be no clear ideological motivation for 
supporting or opposing Chinese investment but was rather split along political allegiances 
(Urdinez et al. 2018). 
More generally, most Argentina senators seemed preoccupied with questions of 
asymmetry of power. Proponents of cooperation with China have pointed to the fact that 
Chinese investments in Argentina are structurally different than those from western 
sources as they do not have the same stipulations on economic and social policy. As 
Urdinez et al suggest, too, these advocates also argue that the logic of the previous period 
of neoliberal development is being incorrectly applied to Chinese involvement. During 
the debates about the space station, Deputy of Buenos Aires province Adriana Puiggros 
said, 
“[The opposition] shouts fears against possible Chinese imperialism or against an 
invasion, and they argue that an antenna has been installed for military purposes, 
when in fact it has a dimension of 35 meters in diameter and 45 meters in height 
[…]; it is impossible to have a military purpose. So in fact Chinese imperialism 
becomes a smokescreen aimed at defending the Western neoliberalist hegemony 
of the United States.” (Urdinez et al. 2018)
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While Puiggros questionably uses the relative size of the space station’s antenna as proof 
that alarmism over China is unfounded, her point gives credence to the idea of evaluating 
Chinese investment and intentions on its own terms and not in confusion with the 
already-completed damage done by neoliberal restructuring practices. In many ways, the 
past two decades of history show a positive effect on Chinese FDI in Argentina.
Concurrently, its undeniable that many of the features of Argentine society that 
allowed for the deep social and economic conflicts that arose from the 2001 crisis still 
exist and form the basis of the hierarchies and organization of the country. As such, 
regardless of their foreign policy objectives, this places China in a good position to make 
use of these exploitative features. As noted, the way in which the majority of Chinese 
FDI in Argentina has been in primary resource extraction and investing in vertical 
processes that aid in access and cost of these resources have led to concern that the 
colonialism and neocolonialism experienced with Spain and the United States will again 
be repeated. Deputy from Cordoba province Oscar Aguad said:
“[Kirchner’s] government rejected, perhaps with good reasons, the agreement 
they wanted to do with the United States, the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas […] What they said then was: ‘we cannot associate with the US 
because that will consolidate a primary goods matrix in Argentina.’ Nevertheless, 
today we are doing the same with China.” (Urdinez et al. 2018)
This quote is particularly cogent and relevant to placing the Argentine discussion of 
Chinese FDI within the context of its own political economy. The Kirchner governments, 
as noted in Chapter 2, were mostly responsible for leading Argentina out of the 2001 
crisis. In many ways, this crisis was understood to have been caused by close, 
56
asymmetrical relationships with Western powers that dictated the neoliberal reforms that 
destroyed Argentina’s social welfare system, significantly stratified social class and 
dissolved most of the middle class, and led many Argentines into unsustainable poverty 
and marginalization, often in slums or other peripheral zone of urban settlement. 
As such, it is unsurprising that these politicians perceived history to be repeating 
itself—not by virtue of malicious powers manipulating the global economy to their 
benefit, but through exploiting already existing structural inequalities within Argentina. 
Deputy Oscar Martinez of Santa Cruz province put it this way: 
“A project with China will not come to meet the great needs facing the country 
and all the people in science and technology but neither will the petty politics of 
businessmen [and] industrialists…who only focus on how best to do business at 
the expense of the people.” (Urdinez et al. 2018)
Martinez is essentially saying that looking to economic, diplomatic, and military security 
through China, instead of a Western power, is only part of the issue. He deftly argues that 
the class structure and overall attitude of business in Argentina also contributes to 
problems of economic hegemony and class marginalization. 
In these ways, Chinese FDI in Argentina has both lifted the country out of certain 
poverty following its astronomical fall during the 2001 crisis, but at the same time has 
drawn comparison to previous periods of exploitative FDI from the Global North; 
sometimes incorrectly, sometimes accurately. The Argentine government and private 
companies have had good reason to be attracted to greater involvement with China due to 
beneficial lending agreements without policy stipulation, breaking from Western 
neoliberal hegemony, focus on infrastructural and other economic development projects, 
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and the highly symbolic and strategically functional alliance between nations in the 
Global South. At the same time, while the relationship between China and Argentina 
cannot be described or analyzed in the same way as previous relationships with the 
Global North, China’s totalizing investment strategy that facilitates control over an entire 
industry from initial resource extraction/production, to transportation, to market, does 
raise concerns over how these powerful economic forces can take advantage of a nation 




 CONCLUSIONS: REDEFINING THE GLOBAL SOUTH
Thus far, I have examined Argentina’s political economy history during the 20th 
century, the history of its urban network in relation to this political economy and the 
development of its center-periphery dynamics both in a local and national context, and 
the role new dynamics that unprecedented Chinese investment have played in either 
strengthening or weakening Argentina’s autonomy, social stratification, and equitable 
development. Although these histories and narratives may seem disparate, the future of 
Argentina’s cities in inextricably linked to these practices and developments. The center-
periphery dynamic evident in Argentina’s urban network is not unique amongst nations in 
the Global South—other countries in Latin America, save perhaps Brazil, and countries 
in Southeast Asia and Africa exhibit similar patterns, some more pronounced than even 
that of Argentina. 
Accordingly, I don’t expect that Argentina’s economic structure will soon 
radically distribute wealth more evenly amongst its cities. Forces of the global economy, 
regional dynamics, and domestic capital production and consumption would all have to 
systematically change in order for this to happen. Were this to happen, the Argentine 
government, as well as provincial and municipal governments, would need to enact 
policies that completely reject neoliberal and neodevelopmentalist models of 
development, regardless of Chinese investment. Instead, I suspect that Chinese 
investment will instead dictate much of the growth in Argentina in the coming years. 
Already, evidence of a slow down in the global economy and a drop in commodity prices 
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have already put stress on China and Argentina’s relationship. As China has primarily 
invested in resource extraction and other primary goods, many of the detractors of a 
closer Sino-Argentine trading partnership are claiming vindication, pointing to the 
similarities this situation shows in comparison to forms of earlier imperial/colonial 
relationships. 
Yet, there is cognitive dissonance for me in naming China a colonial power, given 
its history and context in the Global South. However, China is one of a few countries in 
East Asia, like South Korea, that has seen a meteoric rise in living standards and in its 
place in the global economy. Although these nations rose out of their own histories of 
colonial domination, perhaps scholars of the Global South need to differentiate between 
different tiers within this wide, encompassing region; China undoubtedly yields more 
influence over global markets than Argentina, considered a “middle economy” or poorer 
nations such as Ecuador and Nigeria (both in which China has also made significant 
investments).  
 Furthermore, while the Chinese government and Chinese firms show a 
willingness and motivation to invest not just in resource extraction but also in public 
infrastructure, these potential new assets to their host countries will inevitably be private 
and foreign owned, thereby circumventing accumulation of capital and benefits for the 
poorest.  However, while these concerns are very real, it’s too easy to place the blame on 
Chinese actors. What I hope I have shown is that Chinese FDI began to play its biggest 
role in Argentina when the country was at a breaking point, desperate for capital and 
relief from debt. Chinese capital was able to replace the policy-driven capital extraction 
inherent to its neoliberal reforms that still play a prominent part in the Argentine 
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economy. While this shift was placed within a rhetoric of mutual south-south benefit, 
neither Chinese nor the Argentine politicians and business owners who welcomed this 
investment recognized the lopsided dynamic between the countries, instead comparing 
the seemingly helpful attitude of Chinese investment with predatory Western hegemony. 
In this way, the changing dynamics of the Sino-Argentine relationship are representative 
of changing dynamics within the global economy, especially in the Global South; new 
modes of understanding that incorporate differentiation between nations within this large 
umbrella term need be implemented to better comprehend the possible effects, negative 
and positive, of these power relationships.
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